If conflict is sufficiently costly to the average citizen, then full democracies are unlikely to be at war with each other. However, they may be become very aggressive in their interactions with other types of regimes, so democracy is not always good for peace. Moreover, limited democracies will be the most aggressive regime types, if the leader thinks he can stay stay in power only by appealing to an aggressive minority. Empirically, we find that a dyad of limited democracies is more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute than any other pair of political regimes (including two dictatorships). A dyad of full democracies is less likely to be involved in a militarized dispute than any other pair. Thus, there seem to be strong non-linearities in the relationship between democracy and peace, with limited democracies inherently more aggressive than other regime types. This effect is not limited to a period of transition from democracy to dictatorship. Finally, we find that as the environment becomes more hostile as a country becomes less democratic, the probability of conflict increases most dramatically when it faces a democracy.
Introduction
The idea that democracy promotes peace has a long history. In the eighteenth century, Thomas Paine argued that monarchs go to war to enrich themselves, but the population pays the cost: "What inducement has the farmer, while following the plough, to lay aside his peaceful pursuit, and go to war with the farmer of another country?" (Paine [44] p. 169). Immanuel Kant [33] agreed: "if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game." Many predicted that a more democratic system of government would lead to lasting peace. Commentators and politicians of all ideological persuasions have been drawn to this idea. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton [15] used it to justify his support of democratization around the world. Currently, the democratic peace hypothesis is popular among neoconservatives (Kagan and Kristol [32] ). It provides a justification for U.S. policy to "seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture" (President Bush's second inaugural address).
A dyadic democratic peace hypothesis does get support in recent empirical studies (see Babst [5] , Levy [35] , Maoz and Russett [40] and Russett and Oneal [49] ). Levy [35] goes as far as to claim that "This absence of war between democracies (our emphasis) comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." Although the data seem to support the idea that "ideal" democracies (such as present day Sweden and Norway) will not fight each other, it is less clear that creating a limited democracy by making an undemocratic country slightly more democratic is good for peace. During the nineteenth century, many of the great European powers were not fully democratic and fought many wars. And, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, democratic reforms were followed by war, not peace. Finally, even democracies often are at war with non-democracies. And they become quite aggressive when threatened. For example, the Palestinian people voted for Hamas, which did not have particularly peaceful platform. Similarly, under perceived threats to the homeland, the democratically elected George W. Bush initiated a major conflict in Iraq. These stylized facts lend support to the "realist" counter-argument to the neoconservatives that democratic reforms may destabilize the Middle East. 1 These observations seem confusing and even contradictory. But we show that Schelling's dilemma (Schelling [51] ) can unify and explain them all. Schelling's dilemma is the idea that wars may be caused by mutual fear and distrust as well as by greed. 2 Although a typical citizen may prefer to live in a peaceful world, he may still support a preemptive strike to eliminate a perceived threat from hostile foreigners. In that case, we show that "ideal" democracies are indeed unlikely to fight each other. But Schelling's dilemma can also imply that limited democracies are more aggressive than any other regime type, even dictatorships. Finally, as the environment becomes hostile, an ideal democracy becomes aggressive more quickly than any other regime. And this increase in aggression is even greater when dyadic democratic peace obtains and the environment is peaceful to begin with. We investigate whether the subtle association between democracy and peace implied by Schelling's dilemma is in the data. As the previous empirical literature suggests, we find that dyads of ideal democracies are in fact more peaceful than all other pairs of regime types. But we also find that limited democracies are more aggressive than both dictatorships and ideal democracies. An alternative hypothesis is that the transition from dictatorship to limited democracy fuels nationalism and hence war (Mansfield and Snyder [38] ). Our hypothesis, which does not seem to have been investigated in the literature, is that limited democracies are inherently less peaceful than dictatorships due to structural factors that do not disappear even after a period of transition. Our empirical results, even after we account for regime transitions, suggest that limited democracy is inherently not good for peace. Finally, we find that as an opposing country becomes less democratic and hence more hostile, full democracies become aggressive faster than other regime types.
We develop a simple model of the relationship between political institutions and war when Schelling's dilemma operates. There are two countries, each with a heterogeneous population. Whether the leader of a country can stay in power depends on the preferences of his citizens, the political system, and the outcome of the interaction between the two countries. At one extreme of the political spectrum, "hawkish" citizens always want their leader to be aggressive. (Aggression may represent all-out conflict, or a less dramatic act such as the firing of a missile.) These hawks might be members of an elite, with a lot to lose if their country is defeated, but a lot to gain from a successful war. At the opposite extreme, "dovish" citizens are unconditional pacifists who always want their leader to behave peacefully. A dove can never support a war, even if outsiders are perceived as aggressors. These preferences may be ideological -people support or oppose aggression on principle. Or, as emphasized by Kant [33] and Paine [44] , it may depend on whether the individual personally expects to gain or lose from a conflict.
A natural assumption is that doves are relatively rare. Under this assumption, a leader's popularity is at a minimum after a military defeat or humiliation at the hands of foreigners. For example, during World War I, the German leaders believed a victory would satisfy their population, but a peace agreement would lead to their demise (Craig [16] , p. 382). When it became clear than Germany would lose, Kaiser Wilhelm left for permanent exile in the Netherlands, Ludendorff fled to Sweden (Asprey [4] , p. 486-487, and p. 491).
We assume the median citizen is neither hawkish nor dovish. His most preferred outcome is that both countries coexist peacefully, which seems to be the intuition behind the "democratic peace" hypothesis. However, following Schelling [51] , we assume the median citizen can support aggression out of fear, if the foreign leader is perceived as aggressive. We can think of the median citizen as the leader of a mob which supports aggression if it is justified by the opponent's aggression but not otherwise.
Following de Mesquita et. al. (1999) , a political system is characterized by a critical level of support the leader needs to survive. Each leader derives a private cost and benefit from a conflict, but he also values staying in power. This model is simple enough to be tractable, but rich enough to generate three kinds of regimes. In a dictatorship the leader can never lose power, and the citizens' opinions do not matter. In a full democracy, the leader needs the support of the median voter to stay in power. He will lose power if he does not respond aggressively to aggression, but also if he is aggressive without cause. The third type of regime is a limited democracy where the leader does not need the support of the median voter, but neither can he completely dismiss his citizens' opinions. By assumption, there are more hawks than doves, which gives limited democracies a hawkish bias. In order to maintain the support of the hawks, the leader's must be perceived to be strong. Argentina was not a full democracy during the Falklands War, neither was Germany during World War I, but their leaders could not remain in power after military defeat.
If foreigners are perceived as aggressive, then the median citizen wants his own leader to be aggressive, which gives a hawkish bias even to full democracies. For example, Neville Chamberlain resigned after his appeasement of Hitler, but Margaret Thatcher won re-election after the successful Falklands War. Therefore, we expect full democracies to be more aggressive than dictatorships in environments where conflict is common. Conversely, a full democracy has a dovish bias if foreigners are perceived as peaceful. Thus, the simple model based on Schelling's dilemma predicts a "democratic peace" between full democracies. However, the limited democracy is always the most hawkish regime type, so changing a dictatorship into a limited democracy always promotes war. If wars are indeed due to Schelling's dilemma, then the relationship between democracy and conflict is highly non-linear. Moreover, even though a dyad of full democracies is the most peaceful, democracies display the most sensitivity to an increased threat of hostility. This is because a democratic leader's dovish bias is replaced by a hawkish bias and hence his incentive to be aggressive increases dramatically.
We use the Correlates of War data to measure conflict, and the Polity data to classify regimes as dictatorships, limited democracies or full democracies. We define a conflict within a dyad to be a militarized dispute. These include not only wars, but also other aggressive acts such as the testing of a bomb, which fits our broad interpretation of aggression. Most other empirical studies of conflicts also use the Correlates of War data, and many take militarized disputes as their unit of analysis, as it maximizes the amount of data available. Also, most empirical studies use Polity scores to rank regimes in terms of their level of democratic development. A fixed effects logit specification most closely allows us to answer the question, if the level of democracy increases in a country holding everything else constant, will the risk of war decrease?
As expected, we find that between 1816 and 2000, a dyad of two full democracies is less likely to experience a militarized dispute than any other dyad of regime types (including "mixed" dyads, where the two countries have different regime types). All comparisons are significant at the 1% level. However, a dyad of two limited democracies is more likely to experience a militarized dispute than any other dyad of regime types (again, including mixed dyads, all comparisons being significant at the 1% level). These results are robust to dividing up regimes into three categories along other lines (using the Polity scores). They are also robust to alternative empirical specifications. In our most conservative estimates, the likelihood that a dyad engages in a militarized dispute increases by 36% when a dyad changes from a pair of dictatorships to a pair of limited democracies, and by 73% when it changes from a dyad of full democracies to a pair of limited democracies. Finally, we show that when a country changes from a democracy to another regime type, the estimated equilibrium probability of conflict increases most dramatically when it faces a democracy. Hence, democracies become aggressive faster than other regime types when they face an increased threat.
The data set reveals that many wars involve limited democracies. In the nineteenth century, Britain had a Parliament, but even after the Great Reform Act of 1832, only about 200,000 people were allowed to vote. Those who owned property in multiple constituencies could vote multiple times. 3 Hence, Britain is classified as a limited democracy for 58 years, and becomes a full democracy only after 1879. France, Italy, Spain and Germany are also limited democracies at key points in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These countries, together with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, were involved in many military disputes in Europe and throughout the world. For much of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had many skirmishes and outright wars in the "Great Game" for domination of Central Asia (Hopkirk [28] ). France is a limited democracy at the time of the Belgian War of Independence, and at the time of the Franco-Prussian War. France's successful support of Belgium does not result in the demise of King Louis-Philippe, but France's loss against Prussia forces Napoleon III from power (which agrees with our theoretical model's assumptions about limited democracy). France and Mexico were both limited democracies when they fought the "Pastry War" 1838-1839, ostensibly over the looting of a French chef's shop in Mexico City, but more significantly over the repayment of outstanding debt. Eventually Mexico was forced to repay, which triggered a series of domestic crises that led to the overthrow of Mexico's President Bustamente. France's King Louis-Philippe, on the other hand, remained in power (Frost [20] , p. 170-173). We conduct various other robustness checks to our empirical analysis. A more nuanced picture emerges when we split the data into sub-samples. Before World War II, the data strongly suggest that limited democracies were the most conflict-prone. It is harder to draw conclusions for the post World War II period, since there is both less data and less variation in the data. Very few countries are classified as limited democracies after 1945, and full democracies have very stable Polity scores. In any case, the Cold War was a special period where great power wars became almost unthinkable due to the existence of large nuclear arsenals (Hobsbawm [27] , Gaddis [21] ). Did the weakening and demise of the Soviet Union bring a return to the pre-1945 patterns? The post-1989 period is too short to draw definite conclusions, but for the post-1984 period, it does seem that a dyad of limited democracies again is the most prone to conflict.
The democratic peace hypothesis has persuaded policy makers that democratization of dictatorships, for example in the Middle East, will lead to peace (see, for example, Bush [13] ). Unfortunately, the data, robustness checks and a wealth of examples provide considerable support for a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. If this conclusion is valid, then intervention may inadvertently increase the risk of war by replacing a dictatorship with a limited democracy. We attempt to distinguish our argument, based on Schelling's dilemma, from Mansfield and Snyder's [38] argument that transitions lead to increased nationalism. In our baseline model, the results that a dyad of limited (resp. full) democracies is the most (resp. least) conflict-prone are robust to the inclusion of Mansfield and Snyder's [38] transitional dummy. Thus, the non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace persists even when transitions from dictatorship to full democracy are controlled for. For alternative definitions of regime types, both our theory and Mansfield and Snyder's [38] hypothesis get some support.
Previous theoretical work has investigated the relationship between political systems and war. Jackson and Morelli [30] consider a model where the political leader's costs and benefits from a war may differ from the population at large. This model formalizes the intuition that countries go to war if their leaders preferences are sufficiently biased, i.e., different from the population at large. Two unbiased leaders would prefer to sign a peace treaty (the "unbiased peace"). Levy and Razin [36] study the willingness to make concessions under different political systems. In their model, an uninformed population is more likely than an informed autocrat to favor concessions when the net benefit to this is low. Their model predicts that the probability of peace is higher in a democratic dyad than in any other. Bueno de Mesquita et al. [10] allow a political leader to buy off key supporters in the event that their foreign policy fails. A dictator, who has to buy off fewer key supporters, is hence more likely to go to war than a democratically elected leader who faces rejection by the electorate should he fail. On the other hand, domestic political concerns may force a leader to "gamble for resurrection" and fight or continue a war to avoid being replaced (Downs and Rocke [17] , Bueno de Mesquita and Silverson [9] and Hess and Orphanides [26] ). This is reminiscent of the aggressive behavior of full democracies that arises in our model when the median voter is sufficiently fearful. Fearon [18] studies a war of attrition where a leader suffers "audience costs" if he backs down. He suggests that audience costs are higher in democracies and hence elected leaders can commit to fight and communicate their resolve more easily. Hence, democracies may be less conflict-prone that dictatorships where the leader has less scope to credibly signal his resolve. None of these models appear to predict a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and war.
Theory

Schelling's Dilemma
There are two countries, i ∈ {1, 2}. Each country i has a leader, leader i, and a continuum of citizens. The two leaders play a game which is similar to the arms race game of Baliga and Sjöström [6] . Each leader can choose an aggressive hawkish strategy (A) or a peaceful dovish strategy (P ). The aggressive strategy may represent building new weapons, firing a missile, preparing for war, or attacking the other country. The peaceful strategy means refraining from such activities. Each citizen has a cost type, a cost of aggression c, which is drawn from a distribution F with support [0,c]. We assume F is continuous, strictly increasing and concave. The median citizen's cost type is denoted c med , so F (c med ) = 1/2. The leader has a cost type c which is also drawn from the same distribution F. The leader's type is private information. Everything else in the game is common knowledge. We want to study the pure impact of political institutions and the incentive to go to war without weighing the case for or against any one system of government. To do this, we make a number of symmetry assumptions. First, we assume there is no innate difference between the two countries, so the distribution F is the same in both. Second, we assume there is in principle no innate difference between the leader of a country and a citizen: the leader's cost type is drawn from the same distribution as the citizen's. This also implies that the political institution does not influence the distribution from which the leader's type is picked. So, for example we do not explain why democracies are more peaceful than dictatorships by assuming dictators have lower costs of aggression. In fact, we identify structural features of political institutions that create differing incentives for aggression even without such assumptions.
The payoff for a citizen of country i with cost type c depends on whether the two leaders are aggressive or peaceful. It is given by the following matrix, where the row represents the choice of leader i and the column represents the choice of leader j:
The parameter µ represents the gain from being on the offensive and the parameter d is the loss from being on the defensive. For example, if the hawkish strategy is to attack, then µ represents the "first mover advantage" enjoyed by the aggressor, while d is the opponent's cost of defending itself against a surprise attack. If aggression represents the successful firing of a missile, then µ might represent the utility gain from a bargaining advantage in some international negotiation, while d is the corresponding loss to the opponent.
A citizen of cost type c is a hawkish type if c < µ. For the hawkish type, A is a dominant strategy, because Assumption 1 implies µ − c > 0 and −c > −d. A hawk is a greedy type who always wants his leader to be aggressive. The fraction of citizens who are hawks is F (µ). A citizen of cost type c is a dovish type if c > d. For the dovish type, P is a dominant strategy, because Assumption 1 implies −d > −c and 0 > µ − c. A dove is a pacifistic type who always wants his leader to be peaceful. The fraction of citizens who are doves
A citizen of cost type c is a normal type if µ < c < d. The normal type is neither hawkish nor dovish: he thinks the best response to A is A, and the best response to P is P . The fraction of citizens who are normal types is F (d) − F (µ). For the normal type, there is no dominant strategy: the game is akin to a stag-hunt game, where the best response is to match the action of the opponent. Assumption 1 implies that the median citizen is a normal type. Thus, the representative (median) citizen wants his own leader to be aggressive if and only if the other leader is aggressive. This is the basis for Schelling's dilemma. Our key assumption is the following: Assumption 2. Greed is more prevalent than pacifism:
Political Regimes
After the two leaders have chosen their strategies, each citizen decides whether or not to support his leader. A citizen of country i backs leader i if and only if leader i's action was a best-response to leader j's action according to the citizen's preferences (as given by (1)). Each citizen sees himself as a "principal" and the leader as his "agent". He rewards the leader with his support if he takes the action the citizen himself would have taken in the same circumstances and punishes him by withholding his support otherwise. Leader i needs the backing of at least a fraction σ * i ≤ 1/2 of his population in order to stay in power. 4 We can use σ * i
to study circumstances where the leader needs the support of a large coalition of agents to survive in power and also those where he can get by with very little support. In fact, we will show below that this simple variable generates the three types of political regimes we study in this paper. The value of staying in power is R > 0, which we refer to as the rents from office. To simplify the exposition, we assume R < µ. This assumption guarantees that the most aggressive leader (cost type c = 0) always prefers to choose H, even if this means he risks losing power. Removing this assumption will not change our main results, but it would introduce the possibility of multiple equilibria, without adding any insights. In reality, the level of democracy may influence the value of staying in power. For example, R may be greater in less democratic countries. Leaders in such countries may even face execution after they are overthrown, making R extremely big. We abstract away from such asymmetries between political regimes. We show that Schelling's dilemma and the critical fraction of support needed to survive together generate a non-linear relationship between political regimes and aggression.
Whether a citizen supports his leader or not depends on his cost type and the action profile that was played. If leader i takes the aggressive action, then he is definitely supported by the hawks, but he is supported by the normal types only if the opponent is also aggressive. If leader i takes the peaceful action, then he is definitely supported by the doves, but he is supported by the normal types only if the opponent is also peaceful. The following table shows the types of citizens who support leader i, and in parenthesis their fraction of the population. The row represents the choice of leader i and the column represents the choice of the opponent, leader j.
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Assumptions 1 and 2 imply
In order to maximize his support, the leader should match the opponent's behavior, since this is what the median citizen wants. Deviations lead to loss of support. If leader i responds to an aggressive opponent by choosing P instead of A, then he suffers a net loss of support equal to
On the other hand, if leader i responds to a peaceful opponent by choosing A instead of P , then he suffers a net loss of
Thus, taking the "wrong" action when the opponent is hawkish is more costly, in terms of loss of support, than taking the "wrong" action when the opponent is dovish. Leader i's support reaches a minimum, 1−F (d), if he responds dovishly to a hawk. This is consistent with Schelling's analysis [51] , which emphasizes fear as a driving motive for action. If the median citizen supports his leader, then the leader has the support of at least half the population. Therefore, as we assume σ * i ≤ 1/2, the support of the median citizen is sufficient to remain in power in any political regime. If F (µ) < σ * i ≤ 1/2, then the support of the median citizen is also necessary for the leader to remain in power, and country i is a full democracy. Since the median voter is a normal type, leader i enjoys rents from office if and only if he matches the action of the opponent. Therefore, if country i is a full democracy, then leader i's payoff matrix is
where c is his cost type.
, then the leader can also stay in power if he has the support of the hawks, and country i is classified as a limited democracy. The only case where he will not enjoy rents from office is if he is dovish and his opponent is hawkish. Therefore, if country i is a limited democracy, then leader i's payoff matrix is
, then leader i can never lose power, since his support is never less than
then country i is classified as a dictatorship or autocracy. In a dictatorship, domestic political survival is guaranteed, and domestic politics plays no role in the leader's decision-making. Hence, the leader's payoff function is simply given by (1), where c is his cost type.
Equilibrium
Let country i's regime type be denoted T i ∈ {De, Di, Li}, corresponding to full democracy, dictatorship and limited democracy. Leader i knows the regime type of country j but does not know the cost type of leader j. Leader i's optimal decision depends on his own cost type, his own regime type, and the probability he assigns to the event that leader j plays A.
First, if country i is a dictatorship, then the payoffs of leader i are given by (1) . Hence, if the probability that leader j plays A is p j , then leader i prefers A if −c i + (1 − p j )µ ≥ −dp j which is true if and only if c i ≤ µ + (d − µ) p j . Therefore, the probability that leader i chooses A is
The function h(·, Di) can be thought of as a dictator's best response function.
Second, in a limited democracy, leader i's payoffs are given by (6) . Hence, if the probability that leader j plays A is p j , then leader i prefers A if
which is true if and only if c i ≤ µ + p j (d + R − µ) . Therefore, the probability that the leader of country i chooses A is p i = h(p j , Li), where
This is the best response function for the leader of a limited democracy. Third, in a full democracy, leader i's payoffs are given by (5) . If leader j chooses A with probability p j , then leader i prefers A if
which is true if and only if
This is the best response function for the leader of a full democracy. Since F is strictly increasing and concave, the best-response functions are also increasing and concave. Concavity implies that the two leader's best response functions h(p 2 , T 1 ) and h(p 1 , T 2 ) intersect only once, so there is a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium, each leader chooses to be aggressive (A) with a probability strictly between zero and one. As the best response functions are strictly increasing, the conflict game is one of strategic complements. A leader who is a normal type becomes aggressive when he is sufficiently fearful the opponent is aggressive. Moreover, as a normal type with cost c becomes aggressive, this triggers yet more fear as now both greedy and normal types may attack. Higher and higher cost types may now become aggressive and fear feeds on itself, which is Schelling's dilemma. Changing the regime type in a country exasperates or dampens the marginal incentives to become aggressive for a given cost type. This change is reflected in the leader's best response function. This allows us to study the impact of political institutions on incentives for aggression.
We will not focus on who initiated a conflict, only if a conflict occurs. There is a conflict between countries i and j if at least one country is aggressive. Thus, the probability of conflict between country i and country j is w ij = p i + (1 − p i )p j , where p i and p j are the equilibrium probabilities of aggression for country i and j respectively. Notice that w ij is increasing in p i and p j . For a pair of regime types T i T j where T i , T j ∈ {De, Di, Li}, we denote the equilibrium probability of conflict by w TiTj .
For any p j > 0, h(p j , Li) > h(p j , Di). Thus, the probability that leader i is aggressive is strictly bigger if country i is a limited democracy than if it a dictatorship. The incentive to choose be aggressive is higher in a limited democracy, because if the opponent is aggressive, then the leader of a limited democracy cannot stay in power if he is peaceful, but a dictator can. Of course, p j has to be determined in equilibrium. Strategic complementarity implies that replacing a dictatorship in country i with a limited democracy increases the equilibrium levels of both p i and p j , whatever the regime type in country j. This can be seen in Figure 1 , where country j's probability of playing A is on the horizontal axis and country i's on the vertical axis (all Figures are at the end of the document). Suppose initially, country j's regime type is T j ∈ {De, Di, Li}, and country i's regime type is dictatorship. The equilibrium is the intersection of h(p i , Di) and h(p j , T j ).
Changing country i's regime type from dictatorship to limited democracy shifts the best response function from h(p i , Di) to h(p i , Li), which increases both p 1 and p 2 .
Similarly, for any p j < 1, the probability that leader i is aggressive is strictly bigger if country i is a limited democracy than if it a full democracy. The incentive to choose A is higher in a limited democracy, because if the opponent chooses P , then the leader of a limited democracy can stay in power even if he plays A, but the leader of a full democracy leader cannot. Strategic complementarity implies that replacing a full democracy in country i with a limited democracy reduces the equilibrium levels of both p i and p j , whatever the regime type in country j. Again, this can be seen in Figure 1 (the best response function from h(p i , De) to h(p i , Li)).
We summarize these arguments as follows:
Proposition 1 Warlike Limited Democracy: Replacing any other regime type in country i with a limited democracy increases the equilibrium probability of conflict, whatever the regime type in country j.
Next, consider the democratic peace hypothesis: are dyads of full democracies more peaceful than all other dyads of regime types? The model does not give an unambiguous answer. Facing a hawkish opponent, there is a hawkish bias in full democracies, because the leader only survives if he responds to A with A. But facing a dovish opponent, there is a dovish bias in full democracies, because the leader only survives if he responds to P with P . If the opponent is equally likely to choose A and P , p j = 1/2, then there is no bias in either direction. If p j < 1/2 then there is a dovish bias, and the leader of the full democracy is more likely to choose P than than a dictator. If p j > 1/2 then there is a hawkish bias and the leader of the full democracy is more likely to choose A than than a dictator. (Figure 1 also illustrates these properties.)
But the probability of aggression within dyads is on average quite low. Also, previous empirical results suggests that the dyadic democratic peace obtains in practice. Hence, we focus on this case in our theory. If c med is high, then the median citizen is unwilling to go to war, and it is intuitive that a dyad of full democracies is more peaceful than any other dyad. Figure 2 illustrates the symmetric cases. Formally, we have (the proof is in the Appendix):
, a dyad of full democracies is more peaceful than any other pair of regime types.
While Proposition 2 captures the "stylized fact" of the dyadic democratic peace, the reverse case is also possible in principle. In fact, if the median voter is aggressive and c med < (d + µ)/2, replacing a dictatorship in country i with a full democracy increases the equilibrium level of conflict, whatever the regime type in country j (the proof of this statement is in the Appendix). Hence, in areas of the world where there is constant aggression, the advent of democracy creates a "Hamas democracy" with a hawkish bias. In this case, either limited or full democratization of a dictatorship increases conflict. Of course, there are many historical examples (from the Peloponnesian War to the Falklands conflict and Gulf War II) where democracies have gone to war against less democratic states. In our model, even when the dyadic democratic peace obtains, democracies are aggressive towards non-democracies. In fact, the equilibrium probability of conflict increases dramatically when we compare a mixed dyad containing just one democracy with a dyad of two democracies. There are two reasons for this. First, other regime types do not have a dovish bias and this alone increases the belligerence of a mixed dyad relative to a dyad of democracies. Second, as the opposing country becomes less democratic and hence more aggressive, a democracy become aggressive faster than any other regime type. This is because a democratic leader's dovish bias when he faces a peaceful democracy is replaced by a hawkish bias when he faces an aggressive non-democracy. No other regime type has both a dovish and a hawkish bias so this effect is largest for democracies. Moreover, as aggression feeds on itself, Schelling dilemma implies that the equilibrium probability of conflict increases very rapidly. In fact, as these effects are maximized for a democracy enjoying a dyadic democratic peace, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Hawkish Democracies: Suppose the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis holds and c med > (d + µ)/2. As country j becomes less democratic, the equilibrium probability of conflict increases more if country i is a full democracy rather than if it is a non-democracy. That is
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we investigate the probability of conflict w TiTj in different types of dyads. Anecdotal evidence, as well as the results in Mansfield and Snyder [38] , suggest that limited democracies may be particularly prone to conflicts. Mansfield and Snyder [38] argue that this is a property of transitions from dictatorship to democracy. However, our theoretical model suggests that limited democracies may be inherently more aggressive. Before looking at the data, it may be useful to give a few more examples of "limited democracies". Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is a limited democracy. Power was concentrated in the hands of the Kaiser and the German Parliament, the Reichstag, had little ability to check him. But the Kaiser could not repress the views of the population entirely. The Socialist party formed a strong voting block in the Reichstag and even won the election in 1913 (Craig [16] , Chapter 8). Louis-Philippe, "King of the French", rose to power after the July Revolution of 1830. He ruled as a popular king and was appointed by France's Chamber of Deputies over the monarchists' chosen candidate (Howarth [29] ). During much of his reign, France is a limited democracy. Napoleon III initially ruled dictatorially, but from the 1860s he gave the French Parliament more power (Wetzel [55] ). By 1870, France is classified as a limited democracy in our data. Table 1 lists countries that are limited democracies for the longest time period in the sample used to estimate our baseline regression model. As well as the great European powers, Latin American countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Argentina are heavily represented. Ecuador is classified as a limited democracy for the longest period, 114 years between 1854 and 1971. Middle Eastern countries begin to appear in this classification in the post-war period.
Data
Conflict Data
We use data on inter-state conflict from the Correlates of War [31] project (COW hereafter). This dataset is an unbalanced panel indexed by a country i = 1, ...., N (approximately 190 countries) and a year t = 1816, ..., 2000. Either all or part of this data has been used in almost all empirical studies of the democratic peace hypothesis. The original dataset records whether a given country is engaged in a conflict in given year. In our model, the incentive to be aggressive depends on the regime types within each pair of countries.
Hence, we use the dyadic form of the data which records if a given country-pair is in conflict in a given year. 5 To estimate w TiTj , we use the so-called "undirected" form of the data. Since our theory does not address the duration of the conflict, or the formation of coalitions in multilateral disputes, we drop all dyad-year pairs corresponding to either an ongoing dispute or a country joining an ongoing dispute.
Regime Types
Data on regime characteristics are from the Polity IV dataset (Monty and Gurr [42] ). Indexes measuring competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of the process for selecting the chief executive, regulation of political participation, openness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive are used to construct democracy and autocracy scores ranging from 0 to 10 for each regime. Oneal and Russett [43] and many others take the difference between the democracy and the autocracy index to give an aggregate score, net democracy. We also use this aggregate score to rank countries as dictatorships, limited democracies or full democracies. Very high values of the index signal strong democratic institutions with strong checks on the leader's power. Very low values of the index suggest the absence of any controls on the leader. Intermediate values of the index correspond to regimes where there are some checks and balances that limit the leader's power but not enough to qualify the political regime to be classified as a full democracy. We will use such intermediate values to define regimes as limited democracies. This approach has also been used in other studies that focus on this middle range, sometimes known as "anocracy" or a "mixed regime" (see Gurr [24] , Goemans [22] and Mansfield and Snyder [38] ). 6 
Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy has two steps. We first utilize the Polity net democracy index to construct a set of dummy variables that classify the regime types of each country pair. We then estimate the probability that a militarized dispute (MID) occurs within each dyad. Our regression models include, as explanatory variables, these dummies along with other controls typically considered in the democratic peace literature. Our preferred estimation procedure is a panel logit regression model with fixed effects defined at the dyadic level. This simple methodology allows us to study the effects of democracy on conflict without imposing many parametric restrictions. It is thus particularly suitable for investigating a possible non-monotonic link between democracy and conflict. Moreover, it is the most direct way to investigate the effects of changes in regime types while holding other aspects constant (such as historical enmities between countries). The main restriction imposed by the methodology is the initial classification of regimes into dictatorships, limited democracies and full democracies. The net democracy index from Polity IV ranges from -10 to 10, taking 21 possible values in all. In the baseline model, we divide the range of possible net democracy values into three subintervals of equal length. A dictatorship corresponds to values smaller than -3, a limited democracy to values between -3 and 3, and a full democracy to values greater than 3.
As a robustness check, we consider an alternative classification, where limited democracies correspond to values of net democracy between -6 and 6. There are two obvious implications of this broader definition of limited democracy. First, countries like France which meet the narrower definition at certain points in time, now are limited democracies for an even greater length of time. Second, countries like Spain, which do not meet the narrower definition, become limited democracies according to the broader definition.
Since each dyad records the regime type of two countries, there are six possible configurations of regime types for any pair of countries. As shown in Table 2 , we define a set of six dummy variables, D j where j ∈ J ≡ {DiDi, DiLi, DiDe, LiLi, LiDe, DeDe}. Thus, D j represents a dyad type, ranging from a pair of dictatorships to a pair of full democracies with all other combinations in between. The dummy variable D j equals 1 if the dyad contains a pair of regime types j ∈ J, and 0 otherwise. For our baseline definition of limited democracy, the composition of dyad types varies from a maximum of 31%, for a democracydictatorship pair, to 6% for a limited democracy pair (see Table 3 ).
Our theoretical model is consistent with a broad interpretation of aggression. To maximize the amount of data, we study MIDs rather than just wars. Still, MIDs are rare events (and wars even more so). For instance, in our baseline model, a total of 40,786 observations are included but only 5% are MIDs (see Table  3 ).
The baseline specification of our empirical model explains the likelihood of a MID for dyad d at time t + 1 as
where X dt is a vector of controls, c d is a fixed effect defined at the dyadic level and {D j,dt } j∈J are dummy variables. The fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity arising from factors such as geography and persistence of culture and norms 7 in the cross-section of dyads. 8 In logit regression models, variation in the left hand side variable is important as the model's parameters are only identified if the corresponding regressors cannot perfectly predict the outcome. Hence, since we include both dyadic and year fixed effects in our baseline model, only country-year pairs where at least one MID occurs can be included in the estimation procedure. 9 Further, any year in which no MID occurred is also excluded. 10 To reduce issues of reverse causality, the explanatory variables are lagged by one period.
The entire set of dummy variables cannot be separately identified from the constant term, and thus one variable is excluded from the estimation procedure. We exclude the dummy D LiLi,dt , so the coefficients on the remaining variables {D j,dt } j∈J estimate the partial effects of every other dyad type relative to the dyad of limited democracies. Moreover, the magnitude of each partial effect depends on the fixed effect which cannot be consistently estimated. Instead, we use Chamberlain's [14] conditional maximum likelihood procedure to obtain estimates of the remaining parameters β j 's and γ j 's of (12) without estimating the fixed effects c d . Hence, the partial effect of a dyad type j relative to a pair of limited democracies is
where hatted variables denote estimates of the corresponding parameters. The estimated partial effects 7 For example, in seminal work, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [1] suggest the colonial origin of countries in Africa and South America has played a large role in their subsequent development. See Acemoglu and Robinson [2] for a synthesis and summary of much of this work. 8 The function G(•) is the c.d.f of the logistic distribution function. For a review of qualitative response models and their panel specifications see Wooldridge [56] . 9 The maximized value of the likelihood function is unbounded if these observations are included in the estimation procedure. In this case "full separation" is said to occur (see Albert and Anderson [3] ) 10 The years not included in the sample are 1818, 1819, 1827, 1841, 1843, 1866, and 1891
produce an ordinal ranking of the propensity of different dyads types to engage in a MID. As the partial effects cannot be disentangled from the fixed effects, the baseline model does not produce a cardinal ranking. For example, ifγ DiDi is negative, we can say that a dyad of dictatorships is less likely to engage in conflict than dyad of limited democracies but we cannot say how much less likely. 11 The main prediction of our theory is that a pair of limited democracies is the most likely to engage in a MID. Hence, all the estimated parametersγ j should be negative. Also, the democratic peace hypothesis suggests that a pair of full democracies is the least likely to enter into conflict:γ DeDe <γ j for all j 6 = DeDe. Among the controls X dt 's we include year fixed effects to account for time varying factors that are common to all dyadic pairs (e.g. the number of countries in the system, worldwide economic shocks, world wars etc.). Further, we include cubic spline terms to capture the temporal dependence of MID's onset on the occurrence of disputes in earlier periods within each dyad. 12 We follow the literature on democratic peace (e.g. Oneal and Russett [43] ) in selecting the remaining controls. First, if a country is a major power, it may have more of an incentive to engage in a MID as it can escape retaliation. Or it may be less likely to be aggressive, if it can achieve its objectives without conflict. These effects are controlled for using the dummy variable MajP ower t , which is set equal to one if at least one of the two countries is a major power at time t.
Second, an imbalance of military power may create conflict (Bremer [12] ). The COW dataset contains a measure of military capabilities, which gives equal weight to total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower and military expenditure. The variable LogCapRatio that we include in the regressions is the logarithm of the maximum to the minimum level of military capabilities taken from the COW dataset.
Third, if the two countries in a dyad are formally allied by a non-aggression or neutrality treaty, we set an allies dummy variable equal to one.
We discuss details of the other controls used in the robustness checks below.
Empirical Results
The estimates of the empirical models are shown in Tables 4, 8 and 9 . Each table is divided into two panels. Panel a) contains two columns for each regression model. The first column reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the dummy variables representing the five possible dyads types other than a pair of limited democracies. The second column reports the P -value of a Wald test for the null hypothesis that each D j 's coefficient is equal to that of D DeDe , i.e. a pair of full democracies. 13 Panel b) reports coefficients and standard errors of the additional controls included in the regression models, with the exclusion of the year fixed effects and the cubic spline terms.
Baseline Model
Our baseline model is Model 1 in Table 4 and is estimated using the conditional maximum likelihood procedure. First, all parameter estimates on the dyad type dummies {D j,it } j6 =LL are negative and statistically 11 We also consider alternative empirical models which allow us to estimate all the parameters and hence produce a cardinal ranking. 12 Formal tests support the use of both year fixed effects and spline terms. The estimated coefficient on the spline terms indicate that the probability of a MID is higher when another MID occurred in recent past within the dyad. The use of spline terms allows us to capture the dependence without imposing any parametric restriction in a parsimonious way. Alternatively one can use dummy variables (see Beck, Katz and Tucker [8] ). 13 The t-test (first column) on D DeDe is asymptotically equivalent to the analogous Wald test, and it is thus not reported in the Table. significant at the 1% level. In other words, the empirical model predicts that a dyad of limited democracies is the more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute that all other dyad types. In particular, even a dyad of dictatorships is less conflict prone that a dyad of limited democracies. To our knowledge this empirical result, which is predicted by our theoretical model, is novel in the literature.
Second, as shown in the second column of Model 1, the estimated coefficient on D DeDe is the smallest amongst the dyad type dummies. The P -values reported in the second column show these differences are statistically significant at the 1 % level. We thus also find evidence that pairs of democracies rarely fight each other (Babst [5] , Levy [35] and Maov and Russett [40] ). classified as dictatorships in our baseline model while Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Tunisia are either dictatorships or limited democracies at different times. President Bush has adopted a "forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East" claiming "the advance of freedom leads to peace" (see [13] ). If dictatorships can be converted into full democracies, our work and much empirical research that precedes it provides some support for democratization. But complete success is not guaranteed and intervention may create limited not full democracies. In that case, our results suggest the Middle East will become more violent not less: the limited advance of freedom leads to more war. 16 Democratization carries the risk of triggering more conflict. Table 5 lists limited democracies that engaged in disputes most frequently. Latin American countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru, are heavily represented in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As we have already described, in the nineteenth century, the great European powers are limited democracies and are heavily involved in disputes. In Asia, Japan and Thailand are involved in conflicts frequently. In Africa and the Middle East, countries like Kenya and Jordan are limited democracies for a short period of time but engage in disputes relatively frequently during that period. Table 6 lists dyads of limited democracies that engaged in disputes most frequently. Latin American countries are notable for fighting the European powers and also each other. In one of the most long-standing disputes, Ecuador and Peru repeatedly fight over the Condor Mountain range in the Amazon (Simmons [52] ). The late 1930s and early 1940s marked a violent turning point in the conflict and, during this period, both countries are defined as limited democracies in our data. Ecuador's loss led to a coup against President Arroyo del Río. 17 Peru's victory secured the position of President Prado y Ugarteche who was the first Peruvian President to serve out his term since 1914. 18 Bolivia and Paraguay and Argentina and Chile are other aggressive dyads of limited democracies. Japan is also a particularly aggressive though its aggression is not aimed at any one particular country. It is also interesting to notice that many of these disputes occurred during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. In Table [ TO BE ADDED], we test the hawkish democracy prediction of Proposition 3.That is, while the equilibrium probability of conflict increases whenever a regime type faces opponents that are more hostile, it does so most rapidly so when the regime type is an ideal democracy. These predictions are summarized in (11) . Because, the fixed effects are not estimated in the conditional logit model, our baseline model cannot assess the validity of (11) . Instead, we test (11) using a linear probability model with fixed effects, 14 Only the dummy for alliance treaties is statistically different from zero among the additional controls included in the model. The existence of a treaty reduces the likelihood of a MID within the dyad. 15 Morocco, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are also classified as dictatorships. 16 It has also be suggested that the transition from dictatorship to a limited democracy creates nationalism and hence conflict (Mansfield and Snyder [38] ). We assess the robustness of our results to regime transitions in a later section. 17 See Hanratty [25] . 18 According to Pike ([45] , p. 279), "Prado was given much of the credit for what was regarded by many as the country's supreme moment of military glory in its entire republication history." Model 2 in Table 4 . The Table reports the point estimates of the model parameters, which are discussed more in detail in the next Section. Because of the linearity of the model, the comparison between pairs of equilibrium probabilities of conflict in (??) simplifies to comparing parameter estimates of the relevant regime type dummies. First consider the comparison between a democracy and a dictatorship, or T = Di. As shown in the Table, the point estimates of the regime dummies yield that both inequalities (T 0 = Di, Li)
hold. Further,using a Wald test, the left hand side of both inequalities are significantly different than zero at conventional levels. Now compare a democracy to a limited democracy, or T = Li. In this case, the point estimates imply that the left hand side for T 0 = Li is negative, although not statistically different than zero.
By contrast, the inequality with T 0 = Di continues to hold. 19 Thus we find some empirical support in the data for the predictions of Proposition 3.
Robustness
Alternative Empirical Specifications We consider two other specifications to study whether the results we obtain in the conditional logit specification are robust. These specifications also allow us go beyond the baseline model is assessing how much a dyad type is prone to conflict relative to a pair of limited democracies. Hence, we can quantify, for example, the impact of complete and limited democratization of dictatorships on the probability of conflict. First, we estimate a linear probability model with fixed effects defined at the dyadic level, Model 2 in Table 4 . As shown in the first column of Panel a) all estimated coefficients on regime types are negative and significantly different from zero. Further, the coefficient on D DeDe is the smallest and the difference is significant as shown in the second column. Thus, the linear model also predicts that a pair of limited democracies is the most likely to engage in a MID and that a dyad of full democracies is the less conflictprone that other pairs of regime types. Because of the linearity of the model, the coefficients on the dummies D j are a direct measure of the partial effects. The probability of a MID onset as predicted by the model is 0.0054, and thus the magnitudes of the partial effects are sizable. 20 The baseline probability of an "average limited democracy pair" is 0.0075. It is constructed by setting the values of all other dummies equal to zero and of all remaining regressors equal to the respective sample mean. Hence, the likelihood that a dyad engages in a MID falls by 36% when a dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of dictatorships. Moreover, it falls by almost 100% when a dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of full democracies. Of course, due to the very low MID frequency in the sample, a large fraction of the predicted probabilities have to be negative. In fact, the lowest half of the predicted probabilities turn out to be negative. Hence, we next consider a pooled logit regression model (Model 3 in Table 4 ) which avoids these difficulties but excludes dyadic fixed effects. We enlarge the set of controls to include other standard measures from the democratic peace literature. In particular, we add the logarithm of the distance between the two countries' capitals, LogDist, and a dummy variable, Contig, which indicates whether the country pair has contiguous borders. Unlike the other models, both within and between-dyadic variation of the data is used to estimate the model parameters. Further, in contrast to Model 1, all parameters are estimated and it is possible to quantify the magnitudes of the partial effects associated with different dyads types. As shown in Model 3 in of Table 4 , a dyad of limited democracies is again the most likely to engage in a MID and a dyad of full democracies is the most peaceful (all results are significant at conventional levels). 21 Table ? ? displays the partial effects of each possible dyad type relative to the limited democracy pair. The baseline probability of a MID is that of an "average limited democracy pair" and is constructed by setting the value of all the other dummies to zero. The values of all remaining regressors are set equal to the respective sample mean. The magnitudes of the partial effects relative to the baseline probability are sizable. For example, the likelihood that a dyad engages in a MID falls by more than 73% when a dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of full democracies. Also, it falls by 59% when a dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of dictatorships.
To summarize, both the alternative empirical models we have considered here show that a dyad of limited democracies is the most likely to engage in a MID and a dyad of full democracies is the least likely. This corresponds with the qualitative results of our baseline specification. Moreover, we are now able to make quantitative comparisons. Even the more conservative estimate coming from the linear probability shows that the limited democratizations of a dyad of dictatorships causes the likelihood of conflict to increase by over 30%. A failed attempt to fully advance democratization can make the world significantly more violent and dangerous.
There are several other possible variations on the baseline specification that we discuss here. Economic indicators such as GDP or the level of trade may affect the incentive to engage in conflict. 22 However, reliable data on these variables is not available for the full sample of conflict data and regime type. Hence, inclusion of these controls would severely hamper our ability to utilize all the available data. 23 Moreover, the fixed effects included in our baseline specification capture some of the impact of these variables. First, the year fixed effects capture the impact of global economic shocks and cycles. Hence, economic fluctuations which are common to both members of a dyad and affect their incentives to be aggressive are captured by the year fixed effects. Second, the dyadic level fixed effects control for the impact of the relative disparity of natural resource endowments. These can affect both growth and trade and the impact of constant component of these economic variables is accounted for by the dyadic fixed effects.
Regime Definitions and Transitions
We estimate the model on the entire sample but using an alternative classification of regime types where limited democracies correspond to values of the net democracy index between -6 and 6, and dictatorships and democracies are defined accordingly. As shown in Model 6, the results of the baseline model are confirmed when using this alternative classification of regime types, i.e., dyads of limited democracies are prone to engage in a MID, while pairs of democracies are the most peaceful. 24 Our model suggests the idea that limited democracies, whether they are new or old, have a hawkish bias 21 The addition of more controls and the elimination of the fixed effects changes some of the results for the remaining controls. The Alliance dummy is no longer significant, while MajPower and LogCapRatio are now statistically significant. The parameter estimates suggest that country pairs that have similar military capabilities and countries that are major power are more likely to engage in a MID. 22 Different political indicators for classification of regime types might be another variation worth considering. The most obvious choice is the index from the Freedom House Project [19] . This data has been used in theoretical and empirical studies of democratization and economic development (see Acemoglu et al. [1] and Acemoglu and Robinson's [2] book for an overview of the literature). However, this data is only available starting in 1972. The results confirm our results for the post World War II subsamples reported in a later section. 23 For example, we augmented the baseline specification to include a measure of dyadic trade as a control (we used the data and approach of Barbieri [7] ). The estimated coefficient on dyadic trade was not statistically different from zero. Moreover, due to missing observations, the sample size drops by more than two thirds relative to the baseline model, and only the years 1871-1992 get included in the estimation. 24 The sampling distribution of dyads by regime type using this alternative classification is as follows:
that makes them more aggressive than any other dyad type. Another theory of incomplete democratizations argues that leaders of new democracies rising from former dictatorships are most likely to resort to nationalistic policies to survive in power (Mansfield and Snyder [38] ). To study the robustness of our theory to this change in regime type, we follow Mansfield and Snyder [38] in defining a transitional dummy that indicates whether a transition occurred from a dictatorship to a limited democracy. We use both the definition of limited democracy from our baseline empirical model and the definition adopted of a net democracy index of [-6,6] used by Mansfield and Snyder [38] . As shown in Model 1 of Table 8 , our baseline regression results are not affected when we include the transitional dummy: all dummies are negative and significant at the 5% level at least. The democratic peace hypothesis also gets very strong support. Our theory is thus robust to the inclusion of the additional control -new and old limited democracies are more violent than all other dyads of regime types and a dyad of full democracies is the most peaceful. Moreover, the transitional dummy has the wrong sign and is significant at the 10% level: a transition decreases the likelihood of conflict. When we use the [-6,6] classification, the transitional dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level, while all the coefficients on the dummies for dyads of regime types are negative, though only two are significant at conventional levels. This suggests both theories have some support in the data, at least for some definitions of regime types.
Subsamples We estimate the baseline model over two subsamples of pre-and post-World War II data. This sample split is particularly interesting as Table 6 indicates that a large number of MIDs for limited democracy pairs occurred before World War II. As shown in Table 9 , the results in the pre-World War II subsample are analogous to the ones obtained over the entire sample. All coefficients on the dummies D j are negative and statistically different from zero; the coefficient on D DeDe is the smallest among the dummies D j 's, although the difference is significant for four out of the five dummies. In the post-World War II sample, we find weaker evidence, both for our model and for the democratic peace hypothesis. Indeed, although all coefficients on the dummies D j are all negative, only one differs significantly from zero. Further, only three of the dummies are significantly larger than D DeDe .
Hence, while our theory finds considerable support in pre-World War II data, it finds less support after the war. The main reason for this is probably the decline in the number of limited democracies in our sample. But also, the end of inter-state war in Europe is associated with the Cold War. For example, Hobsbawm ([27] , p. 26) reports that during "the era of confrontation between the two superpowers,..there were no significant inter-state wars in the western hemisphere at all in the 20th century". Gaddis ([21] , p. 261-263) suggests that the fear that any confrontation would escalate into a nuclear war prevented even minor disputes from developing. Within the extended sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, signs of independence were suppressed. Peace was enforced within the Soviet bloc by the threat of violence. But cracks first appeared with the founding of Solidarity in 1980. Also, the newly elected Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan adopted a more aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union, breaking with the previous philosophy of mutual peaceful coexistence and détente.
With the erosion of the power of the Soviet Union, our theory again applies. To study if it is supported in the data, we consider the subsample of militarized disputes after 1984. The decline of the enforcement of peace in the Soviet bloc and the return of the incentives we study should precede the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In 1983, martial law was lifted in Poland and many imprisoned member of Solidarity were freed. 25 In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. Thus, 1984 marks a mid-point between 25 See Perdue [47] for a history of Solidarity. the arrival of Solidarity and the fall of the Berlin Wall and is a natural candidate to study our hypothesis. Also, the amount of available data falls significantly if we begin the subsample later.
The details of the empirical specification are the same as in our baseline model. Our results are reported in Model 3 of Table 9 . A dyad of limited democracies is again the most violent of all possible dyads of regime types and this finding is significant at conventional levels. We also found that this result is also robust to the broader definition of limited democracy we study in the section on regime definitions and transitions. A dyad of full democracies is the most peaceful, but the difference is significant on only two dummies. There is little change in the countries that we classify as full democracies and hence it is difficult to test the democratic peace hypothesis. Model 4 in Table 9 reports our weaker results when we study the post-1989 subsample. Notice that the sample size is halved relative to Model 3 and hence it is difficult to make strong predictions.
However, there is certainly some support for our theory in the data. It suggests that the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offer a better prediction of the contemporary pattern of conflict than the Cold War period. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War, countries arising from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the end of the Soviet Union bring war back to Europe. Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Russia and Yugoslavia satisfy either our narrow or broad definitions of limited democracy during key conflicts.
Conclusions
We have offered a simple theory of political institutions and the incentives to go war. Our theory implies that limited democracies are the most aggressive regime type and, if the median voter is sufficiently passive, that full democracies are the least aggressive regime type. These two conclusions receive considerable support in our analysis of militarized disputes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Our empirical results are robust to other specifications and many robustness checks.
Much research remains to be done. For example, in our model, the leader of a limited democracy does not survive weakness in a conflict. But, not only did the Tsar not survive World War I, nor did the Russian political system. That is, conflict can lead not only to a change in the leader but also a change in the regime type. A dynamic model of conflict and regime change is the next step in this research agenda. Leaders and regimes also change as a consequence of revolution and civil war. We hope to study these questions and others in the future.
A Appendix
It can be checked that h(p, De) and h(p, Di) have a unique intersection at p = 1/2. If p > 1/2 then h(p, De) > h(p, Di). Thus, when facing an opponent who is likely to be a hawk, the leader of the full democracy responds more hawkishly than a dictator. However, if p < 1/2 then h(p, De) < h(p, Di). Thus, when facing an opponent who is more likely to be a dove, the leader of the full democracy responds less hawkishly than a dictator. This fact is used in the proofs below.
Proof of Proposition 2 There are six possible dyads of regime types and, if c med > (d + µ)/2, we claim that the equilibrium probability of conflict is the lowest in a dyad of full democracies. By Proposition 1, we know that w DeDe < w DeLi < w LiLi . When c med > (d + µ)/2, the median citizen has a high c, i.e., he is fairly dovish. This generates a low equilibrium risk of conflict against dictatorships. In this case, the intersection of h(p, De) and h(p, Di) lies below the 45% line, because
It can verified that as long as neither country is a limited democracy, in equilibrium each leader chooses A with a probability less than one half. But for p < 1/2 we have h(p, De) < h(p, Di). This condition and Proposition 1 then imply that w DeDe < w DeDi < w DiDi < w DiLi < w DiLi and this proves the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let p T T 0 denote the equilibrium probability that a regime of type T ∈ {De, Di, Li} is aggressive when it faces a regime of type T 0 ∈ {De, Di, Li}. As the dyadic democratic peace obtains and
we have p DeDe < p DeT < p T De and w DeDe < w T De for T ∈ {Di, Li}. Notice that h(p, Di) − h(p, De) is decreasing in p. Hence, when the dyadic democratic peace obtains and p DeDe < p T De for T ∈ {Di, Li},
Hence, by (13) and as 1 − p DeDe > 1 − p T De , we have
By (7) and (10)
T ∈ {Di, Li} is increasing and strictly concave. Figure 3 shows that (14) and these facts together imply that
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Finally, we include the following proposition claimed but not proved in the text:
. Replacing a dictatorship in country i with a full democracy increases the equilibrium probability of conflict, whatever the regime type in country j.
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose c med < (d + µ)/2. In this case the median citizen has a low c, i.e., he is fairly hawkish. This generates a high equilibrium risk of conflict. In this case, the intersection of h(p, De) and h(p, Di) lies above the 45% line, because
In this case, it can be verified diagrammatically that regardless of regime types, in equilibrium each leader chooses A with a probability greater than one half.
But for any p ∈ (1/2, 1), we have h(p, L) > h(p, De) > h(p, Di). Therefore, in this case, the model produces a definite ranking of the three regime types: the limited democracy will be most hawkish and a dictatorship the most dovish. Formally, regardless of which regime types are interacting, replacing a dictatorship with a full democracy increases the equilibrium values of both p 1 and p 2 . 
Democracy
DDeDi DDeLi DDeDi Dem1 : [4, 10] Notes: Each D j is equal to one over the corresponding net democracy range and zero otherwise. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %. Robust standard errors in brackets below each coefficient. P-value of a Wald test for equality between each coefficient and the coefficient of D DeDe is reported in parenthesis next to the corresponding standard error. Models (1) and (4) are conditional logit models with fixed effects for each dyadic pair. Model (2) is a linear probability panel model with dyadic fixed effects. Model (3) is a pooled logit model. Standard errors clustered at the directed dyadic level in model (2) and (3). Model (4) differs from (1) in the definition of the dummy variables: values of the Polity IV net democracy index in [-6,6 ] are coded as limited democracies, values of [-10,-7] as dictatorships and of [7, 10] as democracies. Each regression model includes (coefficient not reported) year fixed effects and cubic spline terms to account for temporal dependence in the MIDs (see Beck, Katz and Tucker [8] ). Notes: The baseline probability Pr(MID) is the fitted value corresponding to all D j s equal to zero and the remaining regressors at their respective sample means. The reported partial effect in each row indicates the discrete change in Pr(MID) corresponding to a change in the value of the relative D j from zero to one. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets below each coefficient. P-value of Wald test for equality between each coefficient and the coefficient of D DeDe is reported in parenthesis next to the corresponding standard error. All models are conditional logit models with fixed effects for each dyadic pair. Models (3)-(4) differ from (1)- (2) in the definition of the dummy variables: values of the Polity IV net democracy index in [-6,6 ] are coded as limited democracies, values in [-10,-7] as dictatorships and in [7, 10] as democracies. The Dict.-Lim.Dem Trans dummy is defined accordingly. At each date t, the dummy variable detects whether at least one of the countries' political system in a dyad transitioned from a dictatorship to a limited democracy between t-5 and t. Each regression model includes (coefficient not reported) year fixed effects and cubic spline terms to account for temporal dependence of the MIDs (see Beck, Katz and Tucker [8] ). 
